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Abstract The belief that both the behavior and outcomes of students are affected
by their peers is important in shaping education policy. I analyze two polar education
systems -tracking and mixing- and propose several criteria for their comparison. I find
that tracking is the system that maximizes average human capital. Nevertheless, no
single system is unanimously preferred by the entire population. In addition, I find
that the gains of tracking, compared to mixing, are sensitive to changes in the level of
dispersion in the pre-school achievement distribution of the population.
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1 Introduction
Peer effects are at the heart of many recent debates on educational reforms.1 The crit-
ical importance to both parents and policy makers of peer group distribution in school
is indisputable. Given the existence of peer effects, defined here as the effect of the
ability distribution of her peers on an individual’s academic performance, governments
should keep peer effects in mind when planning how to best meet their educational
policy objectives. One situation in which peer effects must be carefully considered is
when governments choose whether to stream (track) or to mix students of differing
abilities within public schools. Under a tracking system, schools are hierarchically
organized to accommodate a range of student performance levels, and students are
placed in the school that best suits their ability level. By contrast, mixing works by
grouping students of differing abilities within the same schools.
The peer group quality affects student achievement positively.2 However, raising
peer quality for every student is an impossible task. From a policy point of view,
the more relevant questions are concerned with efficiency issues. This paper analyzes
efficiency, among other criteria, when comparing tracking and mixing systems. It con-
tributes to the comparison by addressing three main questions. First, it analyzes which
system is chosen by the population under a majority voting rule. Second, it asks which
system maximizes average human capital at the compulsory level and considers how
the degree of dispersion in the pre-school achievement distribution of the population
affects this issue. Finally, it explores whether or not the entire population can be said
to prefer one of the aforementioned systems -tracking or mixing.
To address these issues I introduce a model in which students differ in parental
background as well as in pre-school achievement, which will be positively correlated.
The production of human capital depends on both students’ previous achievements
and peer group characteristics. The degree of complementarity between both inputs,
together with the degree of dispersion in pre-school achievement, is shown to be critical
for the comparison between tracking and mixing systems.
The contribution of my paper to the relevant literature is twofold. First, it analyzes
the role of dispersion in pre-school achievement on the optimal allocation of students.
In addition, assuming concavity in peer effects, I discuss how the complementar-
ity between students’ previous achievements and peer characteristics can determine
which system maximizes average human capital. Observe that there is a clear trade-off
between both properties: while concavity implies an efficiency loss from tracking, the
higher the degree of complementarity, the higher the efficiency gains from tracking.
Second, the paper derives the induced distribution of achievements under each educa-
tional system and compares them, according to several criteria. This is important, as
in the comparison of the two systems the previous literature has only focused on mean
1 See, for example, the “NBER Reporter Online: Fall 2006” available at http://www.nber.org/reporter/
fall06/#report.
2 There is a large empirical literature on peer effects on individuals’ educational achievements. See Hoxby
(2000), Ding and Lehrer (2007) and Kang (2007), among others, who find evidence of significant peer
effects on achievement.
123
SERIEs (2011) 2:31–52 33
effects (see Arnott and Rowse 1987; Benabou 1996, among others).3 In particular, the
“veil of ignorance” approach will be used.
First, my study suggests that, when choosing the education system by majority
voting, a non-elitist tracking system, i.e., a system in which middle class households
get their kids into the high track, is more likely to be politically supported in a democ-
racy than an elitist tracking system that leaves them out. This is due to the positive
correlation between the probability of being assigned to the high track and family back-
ground, which is supported by the empirical literature. Second, I find that tracking is
the system that maximizes average human capital at the end of the compulsory level.
In addition, it is shown that the higher the complementarity between peer effects and
individual pre-school achievement, the larger the difference between average human
capital under tracking and mixing. Interestingly, I find that the level of dispersion in
the distribution of pre-school achievements plays a key role when comparing aver-
age human capital under tracking and mixing. For example, focus first on societies in
which the distribution of pre-school achievement is not very dispersed. In this scenario,
as some dispersion appears, tracking becomes more and more attractive than mixing
for maximizing average human capital. In this case, the complementarity between the
peer group effect and the pre-school achievement level offsets the concavity effect and
drives the result. The gains of the high-achievers (as compared to the mixing case)
more than compensate for the losses of the low-achievers. However, this is not the case
in societies in which the pre-school achievement distribution is much dispersed. In this
scenario, additional dispersion makes tracking relatively less attractive than mixing
for maximizing average human capital. Clearly, complementarity between the peer
group effect and the pre-school achievement level still offsets the concavity effect, but
the losses of the low-achievers might be balanced with the gains of the high-achievers
(compared to mixing). Finally, my study suggests that among all risk-averse house-
holds with uncertainty about their kids’ pre-school achievements, there is no unanimity
on the choice of the educational system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
the main features of human capital distribution under the two education systems at
the compulsory school level. Section 3 compares the induced distributions of human
capital in these two systems. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Individuals
Consider a population of size 1. Individuals differ in two aspects: their family back-
ground and their pre-school achievement, θ0, where θ0 ∈ [0, 1]. To make the model
tractable, I assume that there are only two values for family background, that is,
3 Arnott and Rowse (1987) analyze the optimal allocation of students and resources by focusing on the
degree of concavity of the peer group effect. Benabou (1996) studies the general trade-off between com-
plementarity and curvature when studying optimal community composition.
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individuals can have either poor or rich parents, with probabilities 1−λ and λ, respec-
tively.4 I denote by gb(θ0) the p.d.f. (probability density function) of θ0, conditional
on having family background b, where b = p, r for poor and rich parents, respec-
tively. Richer individuals have more resources to invest in their kids. In addition, richer
individuals are more educated and care more about education, which positively influ-
ences their children’s achievement levels upon entering school. Thus to capture the
possibility that some level of positive dependence exists between parental background
and pre-school achievement, I assume that gp(θ0) = γ θγ−10 and gr (θ0) = 1, where
γ ∈ (0, 1] measures the pre-school achievement gap between poor and rich students.
Thus the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of pre-school achievement, denoted





0 if θ0 < 0
(1 − λ)θγ0 + λθ0 if 0 ≤ θ0 ≤ 1
1 if θ0 > 1.
(1)
Figure 1 illustrates the CDF of θ0 in Eq. (1) for two societies, A and B, that differ
in the pre-school achievement gap between poor and rich students, γ , but share the
same proportion of rich individuals, λ. This difference may stem from the fact that A
spends more resources in early childhood education than B does. In particular, I set
γ = 0.8 and γ = 0.2 for societies A and B, respectively, and λ = 5/6.6
From Eq. (1) we can check that G(θ0) is decreasing in γ . This is illustrated also
in Fig. 1. That is, provided that the proportion of rich individuals is the same in both
societies, because in society A the parameter γ is higher than in society B, the dis-
tribution of preschool achievement in B is dominated by that in A. In other words,
the probability of having a high (low) level of pre-school achievement in society A is
higher (lower) than in society B. In addition, note from Eq. (1) that G(θ0) is decreasing
in the proportion of rich individuals, λ.
Observe that because the gap in pre-school achievement between poor and rich
people is lower in society A than in B, not only the pre-school achievement distribu-
tion is more dispersed in B than in A, but mean pre-school achievement is higher in
A than in B. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the coefficient of variation of θ0,
4 Alternatively we could interpret the two parent types as white or black, natives or immigrants, etc.
5 See Sect. 3.2 for an analysis of the robustness of results with respect to other pre-school achievement
distribution specifications.
6 This means that the mean pre-school achievement level for poor students represents 89% and 33% of the
achievement level for rich students in societies A and B, respectively. According to the PISA 2003 results
for OECD countries, the mean in math performance among immigrants represents about 90%, on average,
of the mean in math performance for native students. The value for λ is drawn from OECD data. In most
studies on poverty, the poor are all individuals living in households with incomes below the poverty line,
which is fixed at 50% of the national median adjusted income (see Collado and Iturbe-Ormaetxe 2008).
According to the OECD questionnaire on household income distribution (2002), those individuals whose
equivalent disposable income in 2000 was less than 50% of the population median averaged 10%, with an
increasing tendency (see OECD 2002). Hence λ = 5/6 seems appropriate if we, alternatively, interpret λ
as the proportion of natives in the population.
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Note: Society A ( 0.8γ = ) Society B ( 0.2)γ =
Fig. 1 The distribution of pre-school achievement
cvθ0(γ, λ). From (1) it is:
cvθ0(γ, λ) =
2(1 + γ )




+ γ (1 − λ)
2 + γ −
(2γ + λ(1 − γ ))2
4(1 + γ )2 , (2)
which is strictly decreasing in γ and λ.7 That is, the degree of dispersion in the
distribution of pre-school achievement is controlled by γ (the higher γ , the lower
the gap between rich and poor and hence the less dispersion) and by λ (the higher
λ, the less proportion of poor families and hence the less dispersion). Below we ana-
lyze the role of the degree of dispersion in pre-school achievement on the comparison
between tracking and mixing systems, by examining the effects of changes in γ and/or
λ, instead of examining the effect of changes in the coefficient of variation.
Finally, observe that the distribution of pre-school achievement θ0 is right-skewed,
that is, the median value of the distribution of θ0 is lower than its average for any
λ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1]. The skewness of the pre-school achievement distribution
might be a controversial assumption. Note that, due to the existing positive depen-
dence between pre-school achievement and parental income, the distribution of both
variables might have a similar shape (see Becker 1993, among others). In addition,
most empirical evidence shows that income distribution is right-skewed (for exam-
ple, in 1989, mean and median US household incomes were $36,250 and $28,906).
While it is not obvious that this is true in all cases, I find it to be a plausible assump-
tion. It is in fact the most usual assumption in the theoretical literature regarding
both earnings distribution (see, for example, Epple and Romano 1998) and pre-school
7 It can be checked that
∂cvθ0 (γ,λ)
∂γ
= − 2[λ(1−γ )(5+γ )+6γ ](1−λ)(γ+1)2
3
(




− 2[λ(1−γ )+γ ](1−γ )(γ+1)2
(γ 2+3γ+2)(λ+2γ−λγ )2σ where the standard deviation of θ0 is given by σ =√
λ
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achievement distribution (Gradstein and Justman 2004). See Sect. 3.2 for an analysis
of the sensitivity of the results of the paper to this assumption.
Individuals accumulate human capital by attending compulsory education, which
is free of charge, and they are not allowed to work.
2.2 Production of human capital
At the compulsory level, individuals are separated into different groups or classes
according to their pre-school achievement levels. To simplify, I consider only two
groups. The production of human capital depends on two factors. The first is the
individual’s pre-school achievement, θ0.8 The second is the “peer group” effect that
depends on the characteristics of the group in which the individual is placed. These
characteristics are summarized by the mean achievement of the group j , or the “peer”
effect, denoted by θ
j
0. After attending compulsory education, an individual with pre-
school achievement θ0 ends up with a level of human capital θ1.9
I assume that the production of human capital θ1 is a twice-differentiable, increas-
ing and concave function. In particular, I assume it follows a CES production function























where A > 1, ρ ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ (0, 1]. The parameter ρ captures the weight of
pre-school achievement on θ1. The parameter β determines the elasticity of substitu-
tion between the two inputs θ
j
0 and θ0. First, regarding pre-school achievement, the
individuals’ levels of human capital are an increasing function of previous achieve-
ment levels, but at a decreasing rate. Regarding the peer group effect, and according
to the empirical evidence, we observe that it is non-linear: the individual’s human
capital rises with an improvement in the average pre-school achievement within the
classroom, but this positive effect has decreasing returns.11 The empirical evidence
8 Observe that both of the individual’s characteristics, pre-school achievement and parental background,
affect her final human capital, but in a different way. Whereas an individual’s pre-school achievement has
a direct effect on it (because further human capital builds on previous achievement), parental background
has an indirect effect through the positive dependence on an individual’s pre-school achievement.
9 There is a large empirical literature on peer effects and still an open debate on the influence of peers on
individual educational achievements, with some studies finding little or no effects (e.g., Angrist and Lang
2004; Foster 2006) and others finding large effects (e.g., Hoxby and Weingarth 2006; Ding and Lehrer
2007). However, this assumption is commonly accepted in related literature. See, among others, Epple and
Romano (1998), Epple et al. (2002) and Bishop (2006), who also assume that peers affect an individual
through the mean of their characteristics.
10 See Sect. 3.3 for an analysis of the robustness of results with respect to this human capital production
function specification.
11 The importance of the individual’s prior achievement levels on the individual’s acquisition of human
capital has been explored theoretically as well as empirically (see, for example, Heckman 2006). Ding
and Lehrer (2007) and Hoxby and Weingarth (2006), among others, suggest that the peer group effect is
non-linear.
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regarding the relationship between individuals’ abilities and the peer group effect is
still mixed. Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) cannot reject the hypothesis according to
which high and low-achieving students benefit equally from the presence of high-
achieving students. However, Ding and Lehrer (2007) find that high-ability students
benefit more from having higher-achieving schoolmates than students of lower ability.
Hence the functional form of Eq. (3) allows for studying how the complementarity
between peer effects and individuals’ abilities affects the comparison between tracking
and mixing systems.
Therefore, on the one hand, the positive impact of an increase in mean achievement
is decreasing, resulting in an efficiency loss from tracking or streaming students of dif-
fering abilities within groups. On the other hand, Eq. (3) allows for the possibility that
θ
j






> 0, that is, high-achievers benefit most from an increase in mean achieve-
ment, which implies that there would be an efficiency gain from streaming students.12
Therefore, Eq. (3) clearly sets up a tension between mixing and tracking.13
2.3 Education systems at compulsory level
In this section I describe the two polar education systems of mixing and tracking and
analyze the distribution of human capital at the end of compulsory school under each
system.
2.3.1 Mixing
In a mixing system, the pre-school achievement distribution is the same in both
classrooms. The average pre-school achievement within each classroom, denoted by
θ
m
0 (γ, λ), coincides with the average pre-school achievement in the population:
θ
m










(γ, λ) ≤ 1/2 for any γ and λ. In a mixing system, θ1 will lie in the
support [m, m], where m and m stand for m(γ, λ) and m(γ, λ) and denote the level
of human capital θ1 acquired in a mixing system by the “worst” (lowest pre-school
achiever) and the “best” (highest pre-school achiever) individuals in the population,
12 In particular, for β close to 0, both θ
j
0 and θ0 have some level of complementarity and as β tends to 1,
the two factors become perfect substitutes.
13 See also Benabou (1996) who, in addition to these two effects, considers whether peer effects are stron-
ger in classrooms with a large or small share of rich individuals. Note that this last effect cannot be analyzed
here because, as we will see below, the way peer effects depend on the proportion of rich individuals varies
with the education system and the classroom type.
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respectively:







m(γ, λ) = A
(














0 if θ1 < m
(1 − λ)ϕm(θ1)γ + λϕm(θ1) if m ≤ θ1 ≤ m









)β − (1 − ρ)(θm0 )β
)) 1
β
. It is straightforward to check
that ∂ FM (θ1)/∂γ is negative and hence FM (θ1) is decreasing in γ . This is because
an increase in γ makes the distribution of pre-school achievement closer to that of
rich individuals. Observe from Eq. (4) that average pre-school achievement θ
m
0 (γ, λ)
(which is the only determinant of the difference in human capital between both soci-









and fM (θ1) denotes the p.d.f. of θ1 in a mixing system. From Eqs. (7) and (8), it is
immediate that the average human capital in a mixing system increases as the disper-
sion level in pre-school achievement distribution decreases (measured by an increase
in either γ or λ). Again, this is due to the fact that the mean pre-school achievement
in the population is increasing in γ and λ.
2.3.2 Tracking
Tracking students implies grouping them on the basis of pre-school achievement. For
the sake of simplicity I permit only two tracks and I denote by δ and (1 − δ) the pro-
portion of students in the low and the high tracks, respectively. In addition, I denote
by t the threshold level of pre-school achievement used for grouping students into one
track or the other. Thus a student is assigned to the high (low) track when her pre-
school achievement θ0 is above (below) t . From (1), the threshold level t is implicitly
defined as:
(1 − λ)tγ + λt = δ. (9)
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Computing the corresponding derivatives in (9), it can be checked that the threshold
t is increasing in λ and γ . Recall that the distribution of pre-school achievement θ0 is
right-skewed. This implies that the proportion of rich students among all high-track
students (i.e., λ(1−t)
(1−δ) ) will be higher than the proportion of rich students in the popula-
tion, λ. This captures the empirical evidence found by Brunello and Checchi (2007),
among others, regarding the socioeconomic composition of the different tracks.
I denote by θ
l
0(γ, λ, δ) and θ
h
0(γ, λ, δ) the average pre-school achievement in the
low and high tracks, respectively. Thus given the distributional assumptions on θ0:
θ
l

























(1 − λ) (1 − tγ+1) + 12λ(1 − t2)
1 − δ . (11)
where g(θ0) = (1 − λ)γ θγ−10 + λ. It can be checked that both θ l0(γ, λ, δ) and
θ
h
0(γ, λ, δ) are increasing in γ . The same intuition used in the case of mixing applies
here.
In the low track, θ1 lies within the interval [l, l], where l and l stand for l(γ, λ, δ)
and l(γ, λ, δ) and denote the human capital θ1 acquired in the low track by the “worst”
(lowest pre-school achiever) and the “best” (highest pre-school achiever) individuals,
respectively:
l(γ, λ, δ) = A(1 − ρ) 1β θ l0. (12)
l(γ, λ, δ) = A
(









Likewise, in the high track, θ1 lies within the interval [h, h], where h and h stand
for h(γ, λ, δ) and h(γ, λ, δ) and denote the human capital θ1 acquired in the high
track by the “worst” (lowest pre-school achiever) and the “best” (highest pre-school
achiever) individuals, respectively:
h(γ, λ, δ) = A
(









h(γ, λ, δ) = A
(
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0 if θ1 ≤ l
(1 − λ)ϕl(θ1)γ + λϕl(θ1) if l ≤ θ1 ≤ l
δ if l ≤ θ1 ≤ h
(1 − λ)ϕh(θ1)γ + λϕh(θ1) if h ≤ θ1 ≤ h
1 if θ1 > h,
(16)







)β − (1 − ρ)(θ j0)β
)) 1
β
for j = l, h. The distribution
FT (θ1) is (weakly) decreasing in γ . The intuition is similar to the one discussed




θ1 fT (θ1)dθ1 +
h∫
h




where fT (θ1) denotes the p.d.f. of θ1 in a tracking system. As in the case of mixing,
from Eq. (17) it is immediate that the average human capital in a tracking system
increases as the dispersion level in pre-school achievement distribution decreases
(measured by an increase in either γ or λ). Again, this is due to the fact that the mean
pre-school achievement within both the low and high tracks increases in γ and λ.
3 A comparison of mixing and tracking systems
3.1 A political economy analysis
Suppose first that the educational system is chosen by majority voting and that every
individual votes for the system under which her final level of human capital θ1 would
be higher. In this case, exactly a proportion δ of the population would prefer mixing
(those with θ0 < t) because in a tracking system they would be placed in the low track,
where they would enjoy a lower peer effect. The rest of the population would prefer
tracking (those with θ0 > t) because they would be placed in the high track, where they
would enjoy a higher peer effect. Thus tracking will defeat mixing, under a majority
voting rule, whenever δ < 1/2 and mixing will defeat tracking whenever δ > 1/2.
Because there is a positive correlation between the probability of being assigned to
the high track and family background, the following empirical implication yields: a
non-elitist tracking system, i.e., a system in which middle class households get their
kids into the high track (that is δ < 1/2), is more likely to be politically supported in
a democracy than an elitist tracking system that leaves them out (that is, δ > 1/2).
This result may help to explain how voters’ preferences may have shaped the evo-
lution of public perceptions towards tracking systems in the US and the different
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patterns of segregation in different European countries. After the Second World War,
the majority of European countries reformed their secondary education systems by
delaying the point in time at which students are selected into tracks and lines (see
Ariga et al. 2005). One recent example is Spain, where the government’s attempt to
introduce a tracking system in 2000 was met with a strong social backlash.
3.2 Choosing the education system behind the veil of ignorance
Most works dealing with the effects of segregation in general (e.g., among students or
communities) just focus on comparing aggregate or average outcomes in segregated
groups, relative to mixed ones. In fact, and as we will see below, this usual approach in
the literature can be rationalized as a constrained interpretation of the veil of ignorance
approach.
In what follows I will assume that an individual’s utility increases with human
capital acquired at the compulsory education level, θ1. In addition, here I consider
that individuals choose the education system behind the so-called “veil of ignorance”.
That is, they choose between societies without knowing where they will be placed or
what characteristics they will have in each society. The idea of choosing from behind
a veil of ignorance, to reflect the fairness of societies, has proved very useful in theo-
retical economics (see the seminal works of Harsanyi 1953, 1955 and Rawls 1971 and
more recently Cremer and Pestieau 1998) and in empirical economics (see Johansson-
Stenman et al. 2002 and Carlsson et al. 2003, among others).14 This is the first study,
to our knowledge, that analyses the choice between different education policies from
behind the veil of ignorance. This is surprising because it is quite a natural approach
in this context. First, observe that real world political debate and specifically, educa-
tional debate, is often framed in terms of general principles of justice or of concerns
for individual liberty. Thus in this way the veil of ignorance approach can be seen
as complementing the standard one. Second, note that families might not be totally
certain under which education system their descendants’ human capital will be higher.
Thus the veil of ignorance approach also incorporates risk and families risk-aversion
into the analysis of education policy evaluation. In other words, the veil of ignorance
is an adequate approach to evaluate policies that affect agents differently, depending
on their position in society, when there is uncertainty about the position each agent
would occupy. This is certainly the case for pre-school achievement of the child and
track placement in education.
The possible implications of this approach have been intensely debated. According
to Harsanyi (1953, 1955), when choosing from behind the veil of ignorance, indi-
viduals would choose the alternative that maximizes expected utility or equivalently,
they would unanimously agree on the alternative that maximizes a utilitarian welfare
function. However, Rawls (1971), who first used the terminology “veil of ignorance”,
disagreed with the utilitarian proposal and instead argued that each individual would
14 Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Carlsson et al. (2003) analyze the individuals’ choice between
alternative societies with different income distributions behind a veil of ignorance. In both experiments
they instructed the respondents to consider the well-being of their imaginary grandchild, that is, to choose
the alternative that would be in the interest of their grandchild.
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adopt a “maxi– min” strategy, selecting the alternative that ensures the best of the worst
possible outcomes.15 I will not discuss here which is the most appropriate assumption
because, although it is certainly important, this debate falls beyond the scope of this
paper.
The Rawlsian approach implies selection of the education system that maximizes
the utility of the worst-off individuals in the society.16 To do this, we have to first
define who are the worst-off in our model. If, for example, we take as the worst-off
those with pre-school achievement levels below the threshold level and with poor
parents, the result is quite immediate. Mixing is the education system chosen. This is
derived directly from the properties of the human capital production function because
maximizing the utility of these individuals will imply maximization of their human
capital at the compulsory level.
Following Harsanyi (1953), individuals behind the veil of ignorance will choose the
education system that maximizes expected utility. One possibility is just to compare
the two systems in terms of average human capital. This is akin to assuming that all
individuals are risk-neutral behind the veil of ignorance. Thus I will analyze the differ-
ence between the average human capital under both systems, i.e., ET (θ1) − EM (θ1).
It follows from (3) that:
















































where g(θ0) is defined above. If β = 1, these integrals can be computed easily, and
it can be checked that in this case ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) = 0. For β < 1, I discuss the
results using numerical simulations. In addition, I present the results for two ρ values:
ρ = 0.75 and ρ = 0.95.17 Finally, and in order to check the robustness of the results to
the design of tracking system, I present all results for three δ values: δ = 1/4, δ = 1/2
and δ = 3/4.18
15 Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) find empirical evidence that shows that most individuals do not follow
the strategy proposed by Rawls, but some do.
16 Observe that this could be the rationale for some recent education policies in the US, such as the No
Child Left Behind Act.
17 Recent empirical evidence (see, for example, Heckman (2006) and references therein) show that fam-
ilies, not schools, are the major sources of inequalities in school performance, implying that ρ should be
high enough.
18 This means that the threshold level, according to which students are grouped in the low and high tracks,
is the first quartile, the median and the third quartile of θ0 in the population, respectively. Note that a tracking
system with δ = 0 or δ = 1 is equivalent to a mixing one.
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In particular, I focus here first on the role of the degree of complementarity between
peer effects and individuals’ pre-school achievement levels (captured by β) and sec-
ond, on the role of the level of dispersion in the pre-school achievement distribution
(captured by γ and λ). To better understand the role of the latter on the comparison
between average human capital in the tracking and mixing systems, I analyze it in two
societies, A and B, that differ in their initial dispersion of pre-school achievement.
This difference might be due to differing pre-school achievement gaps (see Fig. 2a,
where I set γ = 3/4 for society A and γ = 1/4 for society B) or a different proportion
of rich individuals (see Fig. 2b, where I set λ = 3/4 for society A and λ = 1/4
for society B). Then, I analyze the impact of variations in the dispersion level of
pre-school achievement on the difference between the average human capital under
both systems, by examining the effects of changes in λ and γ . Figure 2a represents
ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) as a function of λ for different values of β, δ and ρ. Figure 2b
represents ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) as a function of γ for different values of β, δ and ρ.19
Several results are found. First, Fig. 2a and b suggest that ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) is
decreasing in ρ. Recall from Eq. (3) that the higher ρ, the lower the weight of peer
effects (which is the only determinant of the difference between both systems) on
human capital accumulation.
Second, Fig. 2a and b illustrate that if β < 1, then ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) > 0; fur-
thermore, these figures suggest that ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) is decreasing in β. Hence, as
ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) = 0 when β = 1, it would even be possible to formally prove that
the derivative of ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) with respect to β is negative; unfortunately, this
derivative does not seem analytically tractable at first sight. The intuition of this result
is as follows. As long as β is not very large, i.e., when θ
j
0 and θ0 have some level
of complementarity, then average human capital is always much higher in a tracking
system than in a mixing system. When β is large, meaning that the two factors become
close substitutes, the difference between average human capital under the two systems
disappears. To put it differently, when peer effects matter more for high- (low-) abil-
ity students than for low-(high-) ability students, average human capital in a tracking
system becomes much larger (closer) than average human capital in a mixing system
because this is the system where high- (low-) ability students enjoy a stronger peer
effect. Note that this result is in line with previous results in the literature.20
The final lesson we can extract from Fig. 2a and b that is even more important than
the previous two is that the initial level of dispersion in the pre-school achievement
distribution plays a key role in determining the difference in average human capital in
tracking and mixing systems. First, observe that if the initial dispersion level in pre-
school achievement is low enough, because either γ or λ are high enough (represented
by society A in both figures) and as some sources of dispersion appear (captured by a
decrease in either γ or λ), then tracking becomes more and more attractive compared
to mixing. Observe that this is true regardless of the threshold level used to separate
students in a tracking system and the weight of pre-school achievement on human
capital acquisition ρ. However, if the initial dispersion level is not that high, because
19 In addition, I set A = 2 in both Fig. 2a and b.
20 See Arnott and Rowse (1987) and Benabou (1996).
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either γ or λ are very low (see society B in both figures when either γ or λ are very
low) then, as the dispersion in pre-school achievement increases (again, measured by
a decrease in either γ or λ), tracking becomes less and less attractive compared to mix-
ing. Finally, observe that as the tracking system becomes more elitist (δ increases), and
regardless of the initial dispersion level in pre-school achievement, as some sources
of dispersion appear, tracking becomes more and more attractive than mixing.
The intuition of the previous result is found in the properties of the education
production function. If the initial dispersion level in the pre-school achievement dis-
tribution is low enough (because either γ or λ are high enough) and as some dispersion
appears (captured by a decrease in either γ or λ), the gain in the high track (as com-
pared to the mixing case) more than compensates for the loss in the low track. The
complementarity between the peer group effect and the pre-school achievement level
offsets the concavity effect here, and drives the result. The same argument can be
applied to the case of an elitist tracking system, where clearly the complementarity
effect is exacerbated and makes average human capital in the tracking system much
higher than in the mixing system. However, if the initial dispersion level in pre-school
achievement distribution is not that low (because either γ or λ are not that high), then
further increases in the dispersion (captured again by a decrease in either γ or λ)
makes tracking less and less attractive compared to mixing. That is, complementarity
between the peer group effect and the pre-school achievement level still offsets the
concavity effect, but the losses of those placed in the low track might be balanced with
the gains of those placed in the high track (compared to mixing).
This result yields a very clear policy implication. Namely, a government, while
implementing policies to reduce the gap in pre-school achievement between rich and
poor students, should also choose very carefully the method of grouping them in order
to maximize average human capital. In particular, in societies with high initial disper-
sion levels, and as the government implements policies to reduce the gap in pre-school
achievement, tracking will be more and more preferred to mixing. As the dispersion
level in pre-school achievement decreases, or in societies with low initial dispersion
levels, further efforts to reduce the gap in pre-school achievement make the gains of
tracking with respect to mixing diminish.
This result still holds even when comparing two societies with the same mean
pre-school achievement but different dispersion levels. In addition, it is robust to the
skewness assumption on the pre-school achievement distribution. Both statements
can be checked if we assume pre-school achievement to be uniformly distributed on
(0.5 − x, 0.5 + x) and reduce x . This reduces the variance but keeps the mean con-
stant. Then regardless of the dispersion level, ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) = 0 for β = 1 and
ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) > 0 for any β < 1. Figure 3 shows this result.
It represents ET (θ1) − EM (θ1) as a function of x for different values of β and δ.
Regardless of the design of the tracking system δ, the main results found above remain
true. First, as peer effects and individual pre-school achievement become close sub-
stitutes (β increases), the difference between average human capital under tracking
and under mixing systems diminishes. Second, as the level of dispersion in pre-school
achievement increases (x increases), the difference between average human capital
under both systems increases. This result coincides with the one found in Fig. 2a
and b for society A. Finally, observe that using a uniform distribution for pre-school
123
SERIEs (2011) 2:31–52 47






































3 / 4δ =
Note:                                 1/4β = 1/2β =
3/4β =
Fig. 3 Difference between average human capital under tracking and mixing. The uniform case
achievement prevents us from considering high dispersion levels in pre-school achieve-
ment as the ones considered in Society B in Fig. 2a and b for either low γ or low λ. In
that case, there are not only very few rich individuals, but also the mean of pre-school
achievement among poor individuals is very low. Therefore, the results above for high
initial dispersion levels cannot be replicated here.
Another possibility, while assuming that individuals behave as expected utility max-
imizers, is to compare the two systems in terms of first order stochastic dominance.
Recall that if the distribution of human capital under a given system dominates that of
another, according to first order stochastic dominance, all individuals can be said to
prefer the former over the latter.21 However, in our model neither FT (θ1) first-order
stochastically dominates FM (θ1) (because l < m and hence FM (θ1) − FT (θ1) < 0 if
21 See the seminal paper by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
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Fig. 4 No first order stochastic dominance
l < θ1 < m), nor FM (θ1) first-order stochastically dominates FT (θ1) (because m < h
and hence FT (θ1)− FM (θ1) < 0 if m < θ1 < h). Figure 4 illustrates this result, where
FM (θ1) and FT (θ1) are represented in solid and dashed lines, respectively.22
Finally, I will consider that all individuals behind the “veil of ignorance” are risk-
averse. In this case, they will prefer the less risky distribution of human capital. This
criterion leads to the concept of second order stochastic dominance (SOSD). But,
once again, in general there is no preferred system according to this criterion. On




FM (θ1))dθ1 = −
∫ m
l










FM (θ1)dθ1 + h − m
)
=




(FT (θ1) − FM (θ1))dθ1 < 0, i.e., FM (θ1) does not second-order domi-
nate FT (θ1).
In other words, in a situation in which peer effects matter more for high achievers
than low achievers (that is, if β is low), then the distribution of human capital in a track-
ing system is more “spread” than in a situation in which peer effects matter more for
low achievers than high achievers. Hence in this case the distribution of human capital
in a tracking system cannot be considered less risky than in a mixing system. Thus
risk-averse individuals will not prefer tracking rather than mixing systems. However,
because average human capital is always higher in tracking rather than mixing systems,
individuals will not prefer mixing over tracking systems. Similarly, as β increases,
22 The following parameter values are assumed here: A = 2, δ = 1/2, γ = 0.8, λ = 5/6, ρ = 3/4 and
β = 0.9.
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tracking can be considered less and less risky than mixing. However, the difference
between average human capital under both systems diminishes. As a result, among
all risk-averse households with uncertainty about their kids’ pre-school achievements,
there will be no unanimity in the choice of the educational system. Alternatively, we
can consider that a social planner with SOSD as a justice criterion would not prefer
mixing nor tracking.
The general message we can extract is that tracking is the system that maximizes
average human capital, although, given the choice between tracking and mixing, there
would be no unanimously preferred system for the population. In addition, it is found
that in societies where pre-school achievement is not very dispersed, as some sources
of dispersion in pre-school achievement appear, then tracking becomes more and more
attractive than mixing for maximizing average human capital. However, this is not the
case in societies where pre-school achievement is much dispersed. There, additional
dispersion makes tracking relatively less attractive than mixing for maximizing aver-
age human capital.23
3.3 On the robustness of the results
A crucial aspect of the analysis is the choice of the specific Education Production
Function (EPF) in Eq. (3). This is justified because it allows the comparison of the two
systems with numerical examples when it is not possible to obtain closed-form ana-
lytical solutions. Nonetheless, restricting attention to a specific production function
imposes generality losses. In this case, the specification of peer effects in (3) does not
account for the impact of heterogeneity, as suggested by the empirical evidence found
by Hoxby and Weingarth (2006). In particular, they find that the peer effect depends on
students’ characteristics, and they provide some support for a specification in which
every student learns the most when she is with students like her (see also Manski
and Wise 1983). Now, suppose we consider an alternative specification for the EPF
that captures this empirical evidence. Notice that this pro-homogeneity specification
would underlie support for tracking because not only do good students gain, compared
to mixing, but weak students might as well. In particular, weak students may be better
off in a tracking system if the gain from being with peers slightly brighter than them
compensates for the losses derived from a lower mean pre-school achievement within
the group than it would be in a mixing system. Therefore, would the results of the
paper still maintain? The answer is positive in most cases. Specifically, the main results
of the paper will maintain. Recall that even when ruling out the evidence found by
Hoxby and Weingarth (2006), I find that tracking is the system that maximizes average
human capital at the end of the compulsory level. Thus such a specification capturing
the Hoxby and Weingarth (2006) evidence would only reinforce this finding. How-
ever, the result regarding the education system chosen under the Rawlsian approach
might be reversed now. In this case, individuals with pre-school achievement below
23 This result contrasts to that of Kremer and Maskin (1996), who find that increases in skill dispersion
always promote segregation of workers by skill. However, note that they do not consider the existence of
peer effects, which are a crucial input for explaining the role of skill dispersion on the optimal allocation
of individuals with different skill levels.
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the threshold t , and with poor parents (i.e., the worst-off individuals in the society),
might be better off in a tracking system. In addition, the result regarding the compar-
ison of the two systems in terms of first order stochastic dominance might not be true
now. In this case, and as long as individuals with pre-school achievement below the
threshold t are better-off in a tracking system than in a mixing system, then the former
might dominate the latter, according to this criterion.
Another related weakness of the EPF in (3) is that it is assumed to be the same in
both tracked and mixed classrooms, although, in reality, it might not always be the
case. For example, some proponents of tracking argue that by narrowing the range of
individuals’ abilities, teachers can target instruction to a level more closely aligned
with other students’ needs than would be possible in more heterogenous environments,
implying that the process of acquisition of human capital differs under tracking and
mixing systems. Therefore, removing the specification proposed in this paper will only
reinforce my main results without adding further insights.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I have analyzed public intervention in education when the government,
taking into account the existence of peer effects, has to decide how to group students.
I have considered two different education systems: tracking and mixing. A number
of previous works have studied the optimal education system by focusing on mean
achievement. This paper contributes to this line of research by recognizing the degree
of dispersion in the pre-school achievement distribution to be a key variable that
modulates the impact of non-linearities and crucially affects the comparison between
tracking and mixing systems.
The main result of the paper is that tracking is the educational system that max-
imizes average human capital, regardless of the initial dispersion in the pre-school
achievement distribution. However, the gains of tracking compared to mixing are sen-
sitive to changes in the level of dispersion of pre-school achievement. In particular, in
societies with high initial dispersion levels, and as the government implements pol-
icies to reduce the gap in pre-school achievement, tracking will be more and more
preferred to mixing. As the dispersion level in pre-school achievement decreases in
these societies, or in societies with low initial dispersion levels, further decreases in
dispersion levels imply that the gains of tracking with respect to mixing diminish.
This paper allows for some extensions. An important one is the introduction of
prices, which are omitted in this paper under the assumption of free education in both
systems. Finally, I think that the results presented here are relevant to several recent
debates in the literature on the economics of education. There is increasing evidence
that shows the early emergence and persistence of gaps in cognitive and non-cognitive
skills (see, among others, Carneiro and Heckman 2003). Studies that highlight the
importance of increasing expenditures on early childhood care in pursuing both effi-
ciency and equity provide an interesting illustration. As I have showed in this paper,
a government, while reducing the gap in pre-school achievement between rich and
poor students, should also choose very carefully the method of grouping them, in
order to maximize average human capital or to find the preferred educational system
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in the population. Another example is the literature that looks at the heterogeneity in
grouping policies across countries and tries to explain it (see Brunello et al. 2005;
Ariga et al. 2005, among others). As Brunello et al. (2005) pointed out, efficiency
considerations are insufficient to explain the existing differences that instead might
be driven by some distributional concerns of society.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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